

Walter Goodell  
2/18/2009

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
2 DISTRICT OF VERMONT

3 ROBERT A. FORTUNATI, ADMINISTRATOR \*  
4 OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH FORTUNATI; \*  
5 ROBERT A. FORTUNATI and SUSAN \*  
6 FORTUNATI; and MARK FORTUNATI \*  
7 \*  
8 vs. \*  
9 \*  
10 \*  
11 \*  
12 \*  
13 \*  
14 \*

Civil No.  
1:07-cv-143

15 ANDREW CAMPAGNE, MARC THOMAS, JEREMY \*  
16 HILL, TODD PROTZMAN, ROB SNETSINGER, \*  
17 KARL GARDNER, HUGH O'DONNELL, \*  
18 MIKE DUDLEY & WALTER GOODELL \*  
19 \*  
20 \*  
21 \*  
22 \*  
23 \*  
24 \*

25 D E P O S I T I O N

of

WALTER GOODELL

26 Taken on behalf of the Plaintiffs on  
27 Wednesday, February 18, 2009, at the  
28 Office of the Attorney General,  
29 Montpelier, Vermont.

30 APPEARANCES:

31 GEORGE E. SPANEAS, ESQ., of the firm Clauson, Atwood &  
32 Spaneas, 10 Buck Road, Hanover, New Hampshire, 03755,  
33 appeared and represented the Plaintiffs.

34 DAVID R. GROFF, ESQ., of the Office of the Attorney  
35 General, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont,  
36 05609-1001, appeared and represented the Defendants.

37 ALSO PRESENT: Susan Fortunati

38 COURT REPORTER: Lisa M. Hallstrom, RPR, CRR, CCP

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1 (Commencing at approximately 1:07 p.m.)

2 WALTER GOODELL: Being first duly sworn by a  
3 Notary Public to tell the truth,  
deposes and says as follows:

## E X A M I N A T I O N

5 BY MR. SPANEAS:

6 Q Sir, could you just please state your name and  
7 spell it so we have it for the record?

8 A Walter Goodell. W-A-L-T-E-R, G-O-O-D-E-L-L.

9 Q Okay. And, Mr. Goodell, as of June 24, 2006,  
10 what was your position with the Vermont State Police?

11 A I was the B Troop commander, rank of captain.

12 Q Okay. And do you still hold that same position  
13 today?

14 A No, sir, I do not.

15 Q What's your position -- how's your position  
16 changed since June 24, '06?

17 A I have transferred into the assistant field force  
18 commander's job, which is still a captain's rank, but  
19 the duties are different.

20 Q Okay. What were your duties as of June 24, '06?

21 A As a troop commander I oversaw the operations  
22 that occurred within B Troop's area, which encompassed  
23 the Derby, St. Johnsbury, and Bradford barracks.

24 Q Okay. And now with your position what's your --  
25 what's your job duties or responsibilities?

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1 A Essentially I stand in for the major of the Field  
2 Force Division, which means all of the uniform  
3 troopers in Vermont, in the event that he's not  
4 available or is out of state. I oversee the training  
5 and deployment of all the Vermont State Police special  
6 team assets. I oversee the operations in the four  
7 communication centers around the state and a whole  
8 host of other variety of tasks that I'd be happy to  
9 talk about them if you want them but --

10 Q No, that's fine. So you were -- you did have a  
11 position as a captain June 24, 2006?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Okay. What -- what are the ranks that are  
14 superior to captain in the Vermont State Police? I  
15 just want to know how high up in the rank you were.

16 A Sure. Major and colonel.

17 Q Those are the next two?

18 A Those are the remaining two, yes.

19 Q Okay. What did you do to prepare for today's  
20 deposition?

21 A I reviewed my reports that were prepared, the ICS  
22 forms, incident command forms. I reviewed the log of  
23 events that I asked Sergeant Bruce Melendy to prepare  
24 during the course of the incident. I looked at  
25 newspaper articles that had been written at the time

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1 A He -- he mentioned TSU after starting some  
2 dialogue about the conver -- about the situation. And  
3 we had a telephone conversation where I asked him a  
4 series of questions in regards to specifics to make a  
5 determination as to whether or not I was going to  
6 specifically ask for TSU because he's making me aware  
7 of the situation but within our -- our structure he  
8 can't -- he can't make that happen. It's got to go  
9 through a commanding officer. So he -- he mentioned  
10 this might be a case that we might want to consider  
11 TSU, and then we had additional dialogue where I asked  
12 him a series of questions regarding the specifics of  
13 the case in order to make a determination myself as to  
14 whether or not I was going to contact the assistant  
15 field force commander to seek permission for the use  
16 of that resource in this case.

17 Q Okay. So you have -- you have the authority  
18 to --

19 A Request.

20 Q -- request activating the TSU, and then if the  
21 request is granted, you're in charge of the operation?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Okay. When Mr. Protzman called you -- so your  
24 first conversation with Mr. Protzman about the matter  
25 was over the phone on June 24, 2006, the matter being

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1       Joseph Fortunati?

2       A       Yes.

3       Q       All right. And what information did he convey to  
4       you over the phone?

5       A       He gave me -- initially he gave me an overview of  
6       the situation as it -- as it kind of evolved. He  
7       talked about the previous encounters -- he told me  
8       about the situation that had occurred that day first  
9       in regards to Robert Fortunati and the interaction  
10      between Robert Fortunati and the Vermont State Police  
11      in regards to Robert's request for assistance because  
12      of the situation that had involved Joseph earlier  
13      where Joseph had pointed a firearm at their son when  
14      they went out to visit him at this campsite. So he  
15      spoke about that. He spoke -- when I inquired further  
16      as to location -- we covered a variety of topics, but  
17      we covered the location, where he was -- the proximity  
18      of the location where the campsite was located. We  
19      talked about the interaction that Mr. Fortunati --  
20      Joseph Fortunati had prior to this day that seemed  
21      to -- to start at one level where he had interaction  
22      with somebody from the EPA and then it had seemed to  
23      escalate up to the stage that it was at on this  
24      particular day where there was obviously a  
25      domestic-type situation involving other family members

1 that went there on his behalf to try to -- to try to  
2 move him from that location to property that was owned  
3 by the family, and then the subsequent scenario that  
4 had unfolded where Mr. Fortunati ended up pushing his  
5 son out of the way when Joseph pointed a handgun at  
6 his head and made some comments to the effect that he  
7 had him right between the eyes.

8 We started to discuss obviously the amount of  
9 aggression that had been displayed by Joseph Fortunati  
10 towards his family members, and then I did some  
11 additional questioning with regards to the location  
12 where this incident was occurring and whether or not  
13 there was a potential for anybody else to happen to be  
14 able to stumble into Mr. Fortunati where he was camped  
15 knowing that he had already exhibited this behavior  
16 earlier in the day to make a determination as to how  
17 quickly we need to respond to this situation. So we  
18 covered a large number of questions that I had  
19 relative to the specific situation that this occurred  
20 earlier in the day so that I could make an objective  
21 decision about the next course of action and whether  
22 or not I felt that the situation rose to the level of  
23 requiring a Tactical Services Unit response for an  
24 on-scene commander to manage it effectively to try to  
25 ensure safety of the public, our troopers, and

1       Mr. Fortunati.

2       Q       Okay. After the phone conversation on June 24  
3       with Mr. Protzman, the initial phone conversation  
4       where you were informed of Joseph -- the Joseph  
5       Fortunati matter, did you make a decision with  
6       Mr. Protzman over the phone that you were going to  
7       request TSU or did you hang up the phone, process  
8       information, do something else, and then at some other  
9       time request TSU? Did you tell Mr. Protzman -- sorry  
10      if I'm going fast -- or did you tell Mr. Protzman we  
11      will activate or request TSU?

12      A       I'm not sure exactly how that dialogue went, but  
13      the next step in the chronology of events was that I  
14      contacted Captain John Filipek, who's now the major,  
15      and explained the situation to him and told him that  
16      based upon what I knew about the situation and the  
17      facts that I had been able to collect from Sergeant  
18      Protzman, I felt very strongly that this was a case  
19      where we did want to use the Tactical Services Unit to  
20      respond to try to mitigate the situation.

21      Q       So your next step was to contact Mr. Filipek?

22      A       Yes.

23      Q       And you conveyed information to Mr. Filipek  
24      regarding this situation?

25      A       Yes.

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1 Q And did he say -- he gave you approval?

2 A Yes. After we reviewed all of the facts that I  
3 explained to you earlier that Sergeant Protzman and I  
4 had discussed, he granted the authorization of the use  
5 of the Tactical Services Unit.

6 Q At the time that you requested the TSU team to be  
7 activated, the only information or facts that you  
8 heard were those that were conveyed by Mr. Protzman to  
9 you, is that true?

10 A Yes, but he had additional facts from I believe  
11 Trooper Amado who had conducted some investigation  
12 regarding the events that had occurred in the days  
13 leading up to this event which seemed to kind of  
14 escalate from one point now up to the point that we  
15 were at. I also was provided with information that  
16 Mr. Fortunati had some type of a mental health  
17 background and that there were some concerns in  
18 regards to his mental health background as -- as to  
19 his capacity to actually follow through on the threats  
20 that he had made to his family members.

21 Q But that information was all -- whatever  
22 information that was conveyed to you over the phone  
23 was all from Mr. Protzman?

24 A Yes. Sergeant Protzman was the point of contact  
25 that I had at the Bradford barracks that was providing

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1 managed without the Tactical Services Unit. That's  
2 the purpose of the level of scrutiny that we employ  
3 within our organization is to make sure that these  
4 types of decisions are not -- that they're vetted  
5 at -- at multiple levels of the organization up to and  
6 including the assistant field force commander so that  
7 there is that level of scrutiny that occurs before  
8 that trigger is flipped so that that resource can be  
9 deployed.

10 Q How long did the phone conversation between you  
11 and Mr. Protzman on June 24th, '06, regarding Joseph  
12 Fortunati and the consideration of activating the TSU  
13 take place?

14 A How long was it?

15 Q Yeah.

16 A I would say it was minutes.

17 Q Like minutes could be 58 minutes, 30 minutes, 20  
18 minutes.

19 A Right. Again, it was not a very brief  
20 conversation. It -- there was some length to it as  
21 far as we were able to cover a lot of ground, but an  
22 estimate, probably ten minutes. In that ballpark.  
23 Maybe a little bit more, but in that ballpark.

24 Q And why did you agree -- you sort of told me  
25 earlier, but let me just ask. Why did you deem it

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1 appropriate to request TSU activation based on what  
2 Mr. Protzman was telling you?

3 A Well, ultimately our responsibility is to  
4 maintain the public safety. Beyond that we have a  
5 responsibility to ensure the safety of our own people  
6 and in this case even Mr. Fortunati. The way that our  
7 resources are deployed, our personnel resources,  
8 troopers that are on the road have access to certain  
9 tools available to them on their belt that they can  
10 use in high stress situations to try to mitigate those  
11 situations. In this case looking at the volatility of  
12 the situation, the clear potential for violence, the  
13 violence that had already occurred, the events that  
14 seemed to be escalating each time that we encountered  
15 Mr. Fortunati or that -- that we had any type of a  
16 behavioral pattern that was developing had risen now  
17 to a level where he had access to a firearm and was  
18 threatening to use it on his own family members, the  
19 background that I had from Sergeant Protzman about him  
20 having a mental health history and I think at that  
21 time knowing that there was some question as to  
22 whether or not he was pursuing his therapy as he  
23 should be, all of those factors weighed into my  
24 decision to consider the TSU.

25 And going back to the beginning of my -- of -- of

1 the answer to your question, looking at the safety of  
2 all of the members who were going to be involved in  
3 this situation where we tried to arrest him now for  
4 the crime that he committed that morning against his  
5 family members, I knew that our troopers that are on  
6 the road are trained to a certain level; however, if  
7 you go into a wooded area and you have access to  
8 firearms, our troopers on the road are not trained to  
9 go in and find somebody, establish contact with them,  
10 and then try to de-escalate the situation. And to try  
11 to create the highest likelihood of success in  
12 resolving the situation peacefully utilizing the  
13 Tactical Services Unit, they are trained at that  
14 level, and in addition to that level of training, they  
15 also have access to other tools that do not rise to  
16 the level of deadly force that they might have an  
17 opportunity to employ versus our troopers on the road  
18 that would be forced to shoot somebody as soon as they  
19 came in contact with them if the -- if the situation  
20 warranted it.

21 Q Did Mr. Protzman tell you over the phone that he  
22 had known Joseph Fortunati and Joseph Fortunati was a  
23 troublemaker?

24 A No.

25 Q Did Mr. Protzman inform you or convey information

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1 Q Do you have a copy anywhere of -- of the  
2 informational packet?

3 A I think some of the information that was  
4 contained in the informational packet is contained on  
5 these two maps. I think they were included in that.  
6 If they weren't, then I'm mistaken, but other than  
7 that, I don't have those informational packets. Those  
8 were for people who were participating that day --

9 Q Okay.

10 A -- in various functions in the field.

11 Q You didn't -- you didn't keep like an actual  
12 packet that got stored somewhere in a file for -- for  
13 purposes of the case?

14 A I didn't, sir. Anything that I have is in that  
15 file that you had an opportunity to review earlier.

16 Q Okay. Who spoke at the briefing? And if you  
17 need to refer to your notes or something, you -- you  
18 may, just let me know what you're referring to, but  
19 who spoke at the briefing that you recall?

20 A Where's my other packet? I believe that Sergeant  
21 Protzman spoke, I believe that Lieutenant Evans spoke,  
22 I believe that Pam Barney spoke, and beyond that, just  
23 myself in opening up the briefing.

24 Q Okay. As far as your speaking at the briefing at  
25 the Bradford barracks on June 24, what did you offer

1       in terms of your statement? What was opening up the  
2       briefing? What -- what substance did you convey to  
3       those who were present?

4       A      Essentially it was to acknowledge the people that  
5       were in the room, that we were going to be performing  
6       a mission to go out and attempt to make contact with  
7       Mr. Fortunati for the purposes of taking him into  
8       custody, and as part of that we had prepared for  
9       several hours in the afternoon to try to prepare for  
10      contingencies, and as a result of those preparations,  
11      we were going to lead into this briefing, and then I  
12      turned it over to the individuals that I mentioned to  
13      you already for the specific parts that they played in  
14      it.

15      Q      Okay. And what did Mr. Protzman -- what was his  
16      role at this briefing?

17      A      He was to outline the specific criminal case that  
18      had been generated that morning -- that morning by  
19      Robert Fortunati in regards to the assault that  
20      occurred against Mr. Fortunati's family members by his  
21      son and explained also the events that led up to this  
22      event starting off with the initial contact with the  
23      folks from the EPA and how the -- describing the --  
24      the pattern from the interaction between Fortunati and  
25      the EPA up until today so that everybody in the room

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1 had the same information.

2 Q Okay. And when Mr. Evans spoke, what was his  
3 part?

4 A Essentially he was outlining for the remaining  
5 people in the room that he would be the -- the  
6 operations manager, if you will, for the TSU members  
7 when they were deployed and that he would be following  
8 up with a specific briefing of his own people separate  
9 and apart from that so that it didn't convolute the  
10 overall briefing.

11 Q So did Mr. Evans have on June 24, '06, prior to  
12 deployment a separate briefing between him and the TSU  
13 members?

14 A I believe he -- he did, yeah.

15 Q And those -- the only people present at the  
16 separate briefing as far as you know would be  
17 Mr. Evans and the seven other TSU people?

18 A Yes.

19 Q Okay. What did Ms. Barney -- Trooper Barney have  
20 to say at the briefing?

21 A I believe that she had been tasked earlier in the  
22 day to try to collect some mental health background on  
23 Joseph through local channels. I think she worked  
24 maybe with Trooper Scott Amado in that process so that  
25 we would have as much information as possible prior to

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1 A As far as I know they were, yes.

2 Q Okay. Were all seven of the members or -- or at  
3 least some of them, I'm going to be questioning each  
4 of them so I'm not trying to trick you on the number,  
5 were they all wearing camouflage paint on their face  
6 or some of them?

7 A I think some of them were. I'm not sure if they  
8 all were.

9 Q All right. Was that anybody's decision, you guys  
10 are going to dress in camouflage and paint your faces  
11 or is that their individual own decisions or is that  
12 Mr. Evans' decision?

13 A No. They have issued uniforms that are  
14 camouflage uniforms and they're operating in a wooded  
15 environment. They're -- the object obviously is to  
16 move through that wooded environment to get to an  
17 objective, to make contact with that objective and  
18 determine how that objective is going to react and  
19 contain that objective so that we could introduce some  
20 of those other resources that we have on site with  
21 that HNU team if it isn't a completely passive  
22 response.

23 Q There were two HNU members present, correct?

24 A Yes.

25 Q All right. Was it -- what was discussed about

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1 how to utilize the HNU members in this situation? Was  
2 it Mr. Evans who suggested the HNU members stay in the  
3 van while the TSU members first approached Joseph or  
4 was that somebody else's idea?

5 A It's -- it's the most basic level of law  
6 enforcement responsibility. You can't put these  
7 people who are trained in communications inside an  
8 inner perimeter because they're not prepared for that  
9 mission. They're not trained for that mission. We  
10 get them right up as close as we can comfortably feel  
11 that we can get them and keep them safe until we make  
12 contact with the individual, contain the individual,  
13 and then negotiate, bring the negotiators in and use a  
14 variety of different means to do that.

15 Q How would that have worked in this case best-case  
16 scenario?

17 A Best-case scenario, the TSU members go through  
18 the woods. We hope that Mr. Fortunati is still in  
19 fact at the campsite that he was at earlier in the  
20 day. They are able to create a perimeter so that he  
21 can't get past them and get away and be a problem at  
22 the neighboring residence or go down the road, etc.  
23 After we are able to make contact with him and we're  
24 able to establish a clear perimeter so that we can  
25 contain him and control him, then we can introduce the

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1 Hostage Negotiation Unit members by various means,  
2 whether it be that he's passive and he's standing  
3 there and he's not armed and we can approach on foot.  
4 We can use a bullhorn. Throw phones. There's --  
5 there's a variety of different means that they have  
6 available, but you can't get to C until you get to A  
7 and B, and A is to locate the individual, B is to  
8 contain them to make sure that you're in control of  
9 the situation because as long as the individual is  
10 mobile, they're more of a threat to anybody else than  
11 if we're able to contain them.

12 Q So was the idea to have the seven TSU members  
13 form a circle sort of around --

14 A Not necessarily a formal circle but a containment  
15 configuration where they felt they could control him  
16 if he tried to leave that area, whether they had to  
17 physically take him down or whatever they had to do.

18 They've got the bean bag rounds, they've got --  
19 they've got the tasers. They've got some -- they've  
20 got access to some additional equipment that our road  
21 troopers don't have, and if he approaches them and  
22 doesn't follow orders, get down, follow instruction,  
23 then they have mechanisms -- mechanisms that they can  
24 use. Unless he's presenting himself as a deadly  
25 threat, they've got some options that our road

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1      troopers don't have. So pretty -- you know, again,  
2      it's a bad situation. It's probably the worst of bad  
3      situations when somebody is mobile in a wooded area  
4      because the potential for this thing to move any -- in  
5      any direction exists versus somebody inside a house  
6      where you can put people in -- you know, on corners  
7      and have an eyeball of the entire house. Unless  
8      somebody lands with a helicopter, they're not going  
9      anywhere. In the woods, however, you've got to, first  
10     of all, find the person, which creates its own set of  
11     problems and then, second, develop a strategy to get  
12     around them so that you can contain them and then work  
13     into the negotiation phase, if that becomes necessary,  
14     but you can't negotiate if you don't have the  
15     resources on scene.

16     Q      The HNU members are not also TSU members?

17     A      No.

18     Q      They have a completely different set of training  
19     skills that they've been trained with?

20     A      They are highly trained in de-escalation  
21     techniques and they work very closely with TSU. In  
22     fact, they train together regularly because these  
23     situations occur frequently around Vermont.

24     Q      I see. If the TSU -- just going on your last  
25     explanation. If the TSU had Joseph contained where he

1 couldn't run and they could control him and take him  
2 to the ground or anything, then there's at that point  
3 no point of having the Hostage Negotiation Unit there,  
4 right, because he's already in custody?

5 A Well, it depends on how the situation unfolds.

6 Q I mean, if Joseph was in the middle of a circle  
7 and said, okay, guys, please, can I talk to somebody  
8 nice, and then you bring up the hostage negotiator,  
9 maybe they have a conversation, but how would it be  
10 possible under the situation for the hostage  
11 negotiators to even be used in the way that this  
12 approach was taken?

13 A You couldn't introduce those hostage negotiators  
14 to this individual until you contained him and you had  
15 some observations of him because you would be marching  
16 people right into a situation that are totally  
17 unprepared to deal with it. As soon as we contact the  
18 individual and as soon as we contain the individual  
19 and we can control the individual, those factors need  
20 to be in place so that we can then initiate that  
21 negotiation process if, in fact, it becomes necessary.  
22 If this situation had gone a number of different ways,  
23 hands gone up -- state police, state police, the hands  
24 go up, there might not be a need for hostage  
25 negotiators because the person's totally compliant.

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1 This is not going to be a negotiation because the  
2 circumstances have changed, but you can't utilize  
3 those resources if they're not pre-deployed to the  
4 scene.

5 Q Did any one of the leaders, and when I say  
6 leaders I mean you, Mr. Evans, Mr. Protzman,  
7 Mr. Melendy, let's include Ms. Barney and Mr. Twohig  
8 and Bachand, did anybody suggest using the HNU members  
9 first?

10 A No.

11 Q Did anybody suggest any other alternatives to the  
12 approach of using the TSU members?

13 A We talked about that earlier in the day. That  
14 leads into the discussion about do we use TSU to make  
15 that contact or do we use regular road troopers, and  
16 that's a very easy decision to make given the factors  
17 in this case.

18 Q Was there ever any suggestion about enlisting  
19 assistance from other Fortunati family members?

20 A No.

21 Q Was there ever any suggestion about inquiring  
22 whether Joseph Fortunati had any friends in the area  
23 or somebody he had a good dialogue with or could  
24 communicate with?

25 A Yeah. It doesn't -- discussions like that occur

1 Q It's true what I'm saying?

2 A Yes.

3 Q There were no -- as part of your briefing and --  
4 and information that you had prior to deploying the --  
5 the TSU, there were no complaints from any hikers in  
6 the area, is that true?

7 A Yes.

8 Q There were no complaints from any people that  
9 were driving vehicles along Copper Mine Road, is that  
10 true?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Okay. There were no complaints from any  
13 landowners in the area concerning Joseph Fortunati,  
14 isn't that true?

15 A Yes.

16 Q The area where Joseph's tent and car was located  
17 was not a public place, is that true?

18 A It actually was frequented -- frequented  
19 regularly. In fact, as we were pulling up with the  
20 TSU van a vehicle was coming down the road from that  
21 vicinity.

22 Q From -- from Copper Mine Road?

23 A Well, we were on Copper Mine Road and this was a  
24 side road off of Copper Mine Road. And we're not  
25 clear exactly where, but we believe the vehicle came

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1 didn't arrive until after the chief criminal  
2 investigator arrived and his team. I know that  
3 Lieutenant Evans had contact with Sergeant Flannigan  
4 at the scene so he was around all of the commanders at  
5 the scene.

6 Q Okay. Looking back on this case, Captain  
7 Goodell, do you think it was a mistake to approach the  
8 situation the way it was approached with the TSU  
9 members?

10 A Absolutely not.

11 Q Under the same circumstances you'd do it again?

12 A Hundred times in a row.

13 Q Was the goal of the operation to find Joseph  
14 Fortunati, make contact with Joseph Fortunati, and  
15 then de-escalate the situation with Joseph Fortunati?

16 A Those were steps towards eventually arresting  
17 him.

18 Q And then four would be take him into custody?

19 A Yes. Ultimately that was our goal.

20 Q Right. I mean, those are my notes on -- on your  
21 words earlier, and I just -- I want to be clear that I  
22 think you said your -- your testimony was your  
23 objective or your goal was to find Joseph Fortunati,  
24 make contact with Joseph Fortunati, de-escalate the  
25 situation?

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1 A Yes.

2 Q Let me just show you the first page -- these  
3 documents that I have in front of me, Captain Goodell,  
4 as you can see we took from your file that you brought  
5 here today and made copies of, right?

6 A Yes.

7 Q This first page doesn't have a date on it that  
8 I'm looking at. It starts out with a phone number at  
9 top?

10 A Yes.

11 Q 222-5315. It's not dated. When did you make  
12 these -- are these your notes?

13 A Yes.

14 Q This is all in your handwriting?

15 A Yes.

16 Q When did you make these notes?

17 A That would have been at the time that I received  
18 the call from Sergeant Protzman.

19 Q Okay. So you would have made these notes on June  
20 24, '06?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Okay. I notice off and to the right there's a  
23 note that says -- well, can you read that note to me  
24 there?

25 A Yeah. Combat cross. Acknowledgment of bravery.